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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the steady growth and increase of ad-
ministrative regulation, frequent consideration has been given to
uniformity and standardization of the administrative process at
both the federal and state levels. Many articles and speeches have
advocated legislation on uniform administrative procedure with a
view to establishing consistent procedural patterns and standards
for administrative bodies.1 These activities, stemming in part from
a general dissatisfaction with some agency practices, have resulted
in the enactment of a number of statutes on this subject.2
In 1937, a Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals
was created in the American Bar Association and in the following
year the Committee issued a report on the Judical Review of State
Administrative Action in State Courts.3 In 1939, the same Com-
mittee reported on the Judical Review of Federal Administrative
Determinations and accompanied this report with a draft of a
proposed act relating to state administrative procedure.4 This draft
was referred to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. During the years 1939-1943, the Uniform Civil
Procedure Act's Section of the Conference and the corresponding
committee of the American Bar Association met and considered
numerous changes to the original draft. During this period annual
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'See Aitchison, Reforming the Administrative Process, 7 GEo. WAsa. L.
REV. 703 (1939); Alexander, Administrative Law: A Threat to Our Constitu-
tional Guarantees? 3 NAT. B.J. 276 (1945); Blachly, A New Approach to the
Reform of Regulatory Procedure, 32 GEo. L.J. 325 (1944); Grant, The Search
for Uniformity of Law, 32 Am. PoL. ScI. REv. 1082 (1938); Kaufman, Is the Ad-
ministrative Process a Fifth Column? 6 JoHN MAsHALL L.Q. 1 (1940); Pound,
Proposed Legislation as to Federal Administrative Procedure, 20 IwD. L.J. 29
(1944); Schulman, Administrative Procedure-A Survey of Suggested Re-
form, 15 Tnw. L.Q. 1 (1940); Smith, Administrative Law: A Threat to our
Constitutional Government? 31 VA. L. REV. 1 (1944); Smith, A Step Forward
in Administrative Law, 57 N.J.L.J. 205 (1944).
2 See Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative
Law, 33 IowA L. REv. 252, 253 (1948).
3 63 A.B.A. REP. 623 (1938).
4 64 A.B.A. REP. 407 (1939).
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reports and tentative drafts were prepared for presentation to the
Conference.5 The final draft of the Model Act was approved at
the October, 1946, annual meeting of the Conference. 6
Meanwhile, to meet similar considerations and demands, Ohio
passed an Administrative Procedure Act in 1943. 7 And, after a
decade of legislative deliberation, Congress passed the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act in 1946.8
While much similarity exists between the Model Act and the
Ohio Act, there are variances between them. The writers propose
to consider some of these differences which appear significant. The
distinctions to be considered are created by the inclusion of certain
provisions in the Model Act for which the Ohio Act has no com-
parable sections. The Model Act's major differences relate to pe-
titions for adoption of rules, declaratory rulings by the agencies,
rules of evidence, official notice, and decisions and orders. This
article does not purport to review the sections of the Model Act
which are covered by fairly comparable provisions of the Ohio Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, such as judical review and the publi-
cation of regulations. Frequent references will be made to cor-
responding sections of the Federal Act in view of its extensive
legislative history and subsequent analyses.
PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF RuLEs
Section 5 of the Model Act provides for petitions for adoption
of rules as does Section 4(d) of the Federal Act.10 While these
5 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Report
of Special Committee on Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Fifty-second
Annual Conference, Detroit, Michigan, August 18-22, 1942.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act as revised at the Fifty-second Annual Con-
ference, Detroit, Michigan, August 18-22, 1942.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Report of
Special Committee on Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Fifty-third
Annual Conference, Chicago, Illinois, August 17-21, 1943.
OHandbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 1944, page 329.
7 Omo Ga. CODE §§ 154-61 to 154-73 (1948). The 1943 legislation covered
only administrative procedure in relation to licensing. (120 Ohio Laws 358).
By amendment in 1945, the act was extended so as to cover many of the sub-
jects suggested in the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. (121 Ohio
Laws 578).
8 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-11 (Supp. 1946), approved June 11, 1946.
9 Section 5 of the Model Act reads as follows: "Any interested person may
petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any
rule. Each agency shall prescribe by rule the form for such petitions and the
procedure for their submission, consideration and disposition."
10 Section 4 (d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act reads: "Each
agency shall accord any interested person the right to petition for the is-
suance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
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provisions are phrased differently, they are identical in content.1"
Similar provisions have been adopted by most states that have ad-
ministrative procedure acts.J2 California adds a requirement that
denials of hearings be in writing and within thirty days or else a
hearing be scheduled within that time.'13 Minnesota has carried
the concept still further in its requirement that a public hearing
is a necessary adjunct to a petition.14
In Ohio, there is one such similar section, but its application
is limited to the Board of Building Standards. 15 There is also a sec-
tion permitting petitions for rescinding the rules of the Tax Com-
missioner.16 This, however, is fundamentally an appeal or review
measure, since the section provides that the Board of Tax Appeals
pass on the rules of the Commissioner.
A survey of the state agencies of Ohio,' 7 conducted by the
"1 The United States Attorney General in his Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (1947) has directed that "every agency with rule making powers
subject to section 4 should establish, and publish under section 3(a) (2), pro-
cedural rules governing the receipt, consideration and disposition of petitions
filed pursuant to section 4(d)." (Italics ours). Thus the essential effect is the
prescribing of procedural rules for petitions by agencies under either act. See
also, Fuchs, The Model Act's Division of Administrative Proceedings into Rule-
Making and Contested Cases, 33 IowA L. Rnv. 210, 232 (1948).
12 Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1140.104 (Supp. 1946); Wis. STAT. § 227.04 (1945);
CAL. GOvERNMENT CODE § 11426 (1947).
13 CAL. Govnunw= CODE § 11427 (1947).
14 MINN. STAT. Am. §§ 15.042, 15.043 (1946).
15 Omro GEN. CODE § 12600-290 (1948).160 nO GEN. CODE § 1464-4 (1948).
17 A letter and questionnaire were sent to each of the state boards, com-
missions, and agencies in Ohio, seeking the opinions of the state officials re-
garding the considerations treated by this article. The questionnaire follows:
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF THE STATE
OF OHIO REGARDING THE OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
1 Is your agency engaged in licensing functions?2 Is your agency empowered to promulgate rules?
3 If not, does any other agency or board have such authority in matters
relating to your agency? (Please name the other agency.)
4 Is your agency empowered to make adjudications?
5 Are there within your knowledge any special statutes now in effect
which apply provisions similar to those in the Model Act to your agency?
If the answer to question five is 'yes', please list those statutes.
7 Do your agency's rules provide for petitions for adoption of rules?
(State the rule.)8 By what method could an outside party present a proposed rule, amend-
ment or revocation of a rule to your agency for consideration and pos-
sible issuance?
9 In the absence of such a rule, do you favor or do you object to having
a section allowing such petitions apply to your agency? (Please state
your reasons.)
10 Do your agency's regulations provide for declaratory rulings by the
agency? (State the rule.)11 By what method, if any, could an outside party obtain knowledge of
whether a rule or statute enforced by your agency would be applicable
1950]
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writers, revealed that a significant number of agencies informally
permit applications for changes in their rules and give the requests
such consideration as is deemed warranted.' While the Ohio
agencies recognize the desirability of such practices, and do in-
formally permit petitions, a bare majority of those answering the
questionnaire expressed objections to the application of such a pro-
vision to their agencies. 19 The reasons given for these objections
were of marked similarity to those expressed by critics of Section
4 (d) of the Federal Act.
Various arguments for and against the petition sections of the
Federal and Model Acts have been made. Congressman Francis E.
Walter, speaking in Congress in favor of the Federal Act, said, "The
right of petition is written into the Constitution itself. This sub-
section confirms that right where Congress has delegated legis-
lative powers to administrative agencies. '20 A note to a similar
section in a proposed uniform act,21 which preceded the Model Act,
stated that it would seem that such a right as outlined here already
exists and that the purpose of the section is to familiarize indi-
to him should he take some particular action?12 1n the absence of such rule, state any views you might have regarding
a provision permitting declaratory rulings by your agency.
13 Do your agency's rules contain a section on admissibility of evidence?(State the section.)
14What is your agency's present policy on admissibility of evidence at
adjudications?
15 In the absence of such a rule, what would be your views as to having a
section similar to Section 9(1) of the Model Act apply to your agency?
16 Do your agency's rules provide for the taking of judicial or official no-
tice? (State the rule.)17 What is your agency's present policy on the taking of such notice?
18 In the absence of such rule, what would be your views as to having
a section similar to Section 9(4) of the Model Act apply to your agency?
19 Do your agency's rules provide for written decisions accompanied by
findings of fact and conclusions of law? (State the rule.)20 What is your agency's present policy on writing of decisions, and mak-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law?21 In the absence of such rule, what would be your views as to having a
section similar to Section 11 of the Model Act apply to your agency?
While only eighteen agencies replied to the letter and questionnaire, they
represent the more important state bodies; hence, it is felt that their replies
are of sufficient import to merit appropriate attention.
18 Of the twelve agencies which answered item eight of the questionnaire,
eight permit individual petitions by some informal procedure. It should be
noted that a negative answer to this question does not necessarily infer that
the agency would refuse to accept requests for rule changes.
19 Of the eleven agencies answering item nine of the questionnaire, five
either favored or had no objection to such a provision. Six agencies objected
to the provision; one objected solely on the ground that it was unnecessary.
2 0 Administrative Procedure Act -Legislative History, SEN. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1947), p. 359.
21 Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (1943), pp. 234-5.
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viduals with it and to apprise the agencies of their duty to receive
and consider such requests.
The arguments against the section are essentially threefold.
The first emphasizes the extra work which such a section would
cause an agency. The second is that it encourages minority lobby-
ing tactics, and the third is that it is unnecessary. Each of these
grounds for objection merits consideration.
The critics, whose objections are founded on increased work
load, point out that many additional steps are necessitated by the
procedure without a corresponding gain of substantive benefits.
Initially, regulations would have to be adopted, published, and
disseminated to set up a formal procedure for submitting petitions.
The petitions would require stamping, acknowledgment, and proper
routing; a study of each proposal would be necessary; many more
hearings would be held, causing increased paper work and loss of
time; many more regulations would be drafted and published; and
the agency personnel would need re-education regarding each
change.
The writers believe that some of these obstacles are avoided
by the precise wording of the Model Act section. It is phrased so
as to provide flexibility, permitting ample discretion to each agency.
Hearings on petitions are not a universal requirement. Each agency
is authorized to formulate its own procedure. It does not follow
that the procedural regulations should require hearings on all
petitions for, as it has been stated, such a requirement would cause
a serious waste of time.22 In each instance, the agency would de-
cide as to the merit of the hearing procedure.
It is admitted that the requirement would result in some added
clerical work as well as the possible drafting of additional regu-
lations or amendments. If the provision is meritorious, appropri-
ations should be sought from the legislature to meet any additional
staff load which might develop. Under the most adverse circum-
stances this should not result in the addition of more than a few
new staff members. The argument that the section might result
in the drafting of additional regulations should be balanced against
the desirability for more effective formulation of agency policy.
While it is true that agency personnel would require some re-
education as each regulatory change is made, this problem appears
to be inconsequential if the modification is deemed necessary by
the agency. At any rate, it is doubtful that so many regulatory
changes would follow from the petitions as to create a staff edu-
cational problem.
The argument that the section encourages minority group tac-
tics presents a two-fold consideration. The critics point out that
22 Nathanson, ibid 262.
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a minority group could submit so many repetitious or unwarranted
petitions as to overload an agency, causing a breakdown of its oper-
ations. They also express the fear of powerful minority lobbies.
They feel that such minority groups have tight control over their
memberships and can, by a volume of correspondence or full at-
tendance at hearings, blind the agencies into believing that they
reflect majority opinion, thereby unfairly influencing the agencies
in their determinations.
Again, this first concern is recognized, but it is believed that
the danger is more than compensated for by the advantages gained.
The agency could summarily dispose of the repetitious petitions or
consolidate them into a single action.
The second point relating to concentrated group action pre-
sents a more serious problem However, the possible adoption of
regulations favorable to a minority group exists with or without a
petitioning provision where the policy-determining body is not fully
alert to the issues at hand or is not sensitive to its administrative
and public responsibilities. The argument merely supports the re-
quirement that the policy-makers of administrative agencies be men
of adequate capacities and possess the objective courage to perform
their public duties.
The third objection to Section 5 of the Model Act relates to a
general dissatisfaction with the policies and programs of admin-
istrative bodies and extends to a general criticism of administrative
control, public officials and attorneys. While the section itself is
very brief, the protagonists of this view believe that its adoption
would result in additional regulation, helping to swell the already
crowded law book shelves. While few would stand by such argu-
ment if a provision were necessary to meet a compelling situation,
they point out that there would actually be few requests for rule
changes and that the agencies, without a statutory requirement,
already hear and give such requests merited consideration. Doubt
is also engendered as to the effectiveness of the section to attain
the results sought.
It is undoubtedly true that few petitions would be submitted
to the agencies whose programs contain a minimum of restrictive
or prohibitory features. Yet it does not follow that all petitions
would be without merit. The mere fact that beneficial change in
administrative regulation could result from a standardized pro-
cedure is of itself a strong argument in its favor.
It is also believed by its proponents that the section would help
in fostering good public relations. The presence of a specific petition
procedure could lead to a clarification of the reasons for the is-
suance of a necessary, yet unpopular or burdensome, regulation.
Standardizing the petition procedure, especially in those agencies
[Vol. 11
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where it is informally followed, would tend to emphasize agency
fairness and objectivity and the danger of criticism of action as
being arbitrary and privileged would be less likely under those
circumstances.
While neither Section 5 of the Model Act nor Section 4(d) of
the Federal Act accomplishes all that might be desired, each is of
value for its educational content and the resultant strengthening
of the administrative process. The public would be informed of its
rights and the agencies would be committed to uniform, announced
policies.
DECLARATORY RULINGS By AGENCIES
Section 7 of the Model Act23 and Section 5 (d) of the Federal
Act 24 provide for declaratory rulings by agencies. While the
declaratory judgment has long been viewed with favor as a ju-
dicial instrument, it has not been generally accepted as a part
of the administrative process. To date only Wisconsin has fol-
lowed the leadership of the Model and Federal Acts by adopt-
ing this procedure.25
Essentially, both sections are intended to correct what is deem-
ed a deficiency in the administrative field. Congressman Francis
E. Walter emphasized the need for authorizing determinations
which resolve administrative controversies without compelling a
party to act upon his own view and at his peril in the absence of
clear or specific administrative regulation.26
The sections of the Model and Federal Acts, while having the
same objective, are differently worded. The Model Act section has
been criticized in that its provisions regarding petitions, effect, ap-
peal, and procedural rules appear to be "largely repetitive of other
provisions of the Act and hence redundant.127 Wisconsin, in adopt-
ing its procedure, extended it to provide that whenever an issue of
2 3 Section 7 of the Model Act is as follows: "On petition of any interested
person, any agency may issue a declaratory ruling with respect to the ap-
plicability to any person, property, or state of facts of any rule or statute en-
forceable by it. A declaratory ruling, if issued after argument and stated to
be binding, is binding between the agency and the petitioner on the state
of facts alleged, unless it is altered or set aside by a court. Such a ruling
is subject to review in the [District Court] in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided for the review of decisions in contested cases. Each agency shall pre-
scribe by rule the form for such petitions and the procedure for their sub-
mission, consideration, and disposition."
24Section 5(d) of the Federal Act reads as follows: "The agency is au-
thorized in its sound discretion, with like effect as in the case of other orders,
to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."
25 Wis. STAT. § 227.06 (1945).
26 SN. Doc. No. 248, ibid, page 362.
27 Abel, The Double Standard in, Administrative Procedure Legislation:
Model Act and Federal Act, 33 IowA L. Rnv. 228, 238 (1948).
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fact arises in a declaratory judgment proceeding in a court, the
court shall refer the case to the agency for its determination of the
fact-issue under the declaratory ruling procedure.28 Under this
section the issuance of a declaratory ruling becomes mandatory.
While the Ohio statutes do not provide for declaratory rulings
either in the Administrative Procedure Act or in any sections per-
taining to individual boards, commissions, or agencies, our survey
revealed that some Ohio agencies do issue "unofficial" rulings. 29
However, since these actions do not have the sanction of statutes,
they are not necessarily binding, nor are they subject to judicial
review.
The majority of the Ohio agencies replying to the questionnaire
did not favor the statutory adoption of the Model Act's declaratory
ruling procedure.3 0 They contended that the work load of the
agencies would be increased, that this system is more properly a
judicial function, and that other interested persons would contend
that their fact-situations are covered by declaratory rulings which
are not in point.
The above arguments and others have been directed at the
Federal Act and other similar proposals. Iir. Robert M. Benjamin,
in his report to the Governor of New York, disapproved of such
legislation on the ground that it is impossible to define the circum-
stances in which it will be practicable to issue administrative rul-
ings, and it is therefore not desirable to impose on any adminis-
trative agency legal obligations to formulate such orders.3 ' He
further believed that, should there be a need for such legislation,
it should be directed to the specific agencies in particular fields of
administrative activity.
Additional reasons for objecting to such legislation are based
upon a dislike of the declaratory judgment procedure and an un-
willingness to see the procedure extended. This objection includes
the belief that the regulations are generally written in simple lan-
guage and are capable of interpretation by anyone. Further, when
the subject matter is intricate and the regulation is necessarily com-
plex, the interested party should hire an attorney for guidance.
Fear has also been expressed that certain interested persons might
attempt to exploit the procedure by submitting innumerable re-
quests for rulings on slightly altered facts in "an effort to reach
the outermost edge of legal conduct without stepping over the
28 Wis. STAT. § 227.05 (1945).
29 Of the ten agencies replying to the question, seven rule on such requests
in an informal manner.
3 0 Four agencies objected, two favored, and four expressed no opinion as
to this section of the Model Act.
311 BENJAMIN, ADmNTRATIVE ADJUDICATION Ix NwV Yonx 261 (1942).
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boundary into actual illegality. '3 2
A further objection to this and other uniform administrative
procedure regulations is that the undeviating court procedures
which are ponderous and time-consuming should not be imposed
upon the administrative process where flexibility and alacrity are
so fundamental.
The preceding discussion of petitions for adoption of rules em-
braces some of the general arguments and answers which are ap-
plicable to these considerations. Undoubtedly, some increased work
load would result from the enactment of this provision; however,
it might reduce some phases of enforcement activity in that inno-
cent violations might be eliminated by the clarification of the mean-
ing of regulations. Also, where reasonable discretion is permitted
the agencies, there need be little concern regarding increased work
load. The Federal Act provision on declaratory rulings is restrict-
ed by the introductory provisions of Section 5 and permits the
agency to use "sound discretion" in giving rulings. A refusal to
give a declaratory ruling is subject to judicial review. The Model
Act, on the other hand, provides that any agency "may" issue such
a ruling. Since that procedure is enabling and permissive only,33
no refusal could become the subject of judicial review. Notwith-
standing the fact that the Federal Act does not provide the dis-
cretion allowed agencies by the Model Act, the experience of fed-
eral agencies does not indicate that the increase of work under the
Federal Act has been excessively burdensome. The public bene-
fits derived from the procedure seem to counterbalance these ob-
jections.
The Model Act is subject to almost irrefutable criticism in
that a refusal to make a ruling, regardless of the merits, is not sub-
ject to judicial review. In view of this, it might follow that the
Federal Act provision is more desirable than the Model Act sec-
tion.
The belief that the declaratory ruling procedure is more proper-
ly a judicial function is incongruous since the administrative
agencies to be affected have adjudicatory powers. While the Model
Act purports to extend the declaratory ruling authority to "all"
agencies, such authority would, in fact, be given only to those
bodies having previously existing adjudicatory powers. Further-
more, this is an extension of powers, not a restriction. There seems
to be little reason why an agency adjudication should be subject to
greater limitation than is that of the courts.
32Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure (1941), page 30.
33 Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. Rzv.
196, 204 (1948).
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Strong objection to the section has been made on the ground
that other parties would contend that their situations were covered
by declaratory rulings which the agency considers inapplicable.
Agency objection, for the most part, is based upon the difficulty of
restricting declaratory rulings to the immediate factual pattern. If
such rulings are, in fact, inapplicable, the cases should be sufficient-
ly distinguishable. If, on the other hand, distinguishing features
are not discernible as between the fact-issues, appropriate declar-
atory rulings should be made applicable to all affected parties. No
reason is apparent why the principles of equal treatment to all and
predictability of the law should be withheld from the administrative
arena. This argument in opposition to the section could be present-
ed with equal force to the drafting of any legislative, administrative
or judicial measure. Any written document may be subject to mis-
interpretation. The answer to this problem is not in refraining
from the performance of an essential or helpful function but in
executing competent rulings by government officials charged with
such responsibility.
The objections voiced by Mr. Benjamin as to the difficulty in
defining the circumstances under which administrative rulings
shall be made has been met by both the Model and Federal Acts.
It should be noted that the Benjamin report was made in March,
1942, and that both Acts came later. The Model Act recognized
and avoided the problem by leaving the issuance of such rulings
to the discretion of the agency. No attempt was made to develop
standards' or criteria for the giving of declaratory rulings. The
Federal Act, on the other hand, authorizes the issuance of decla-
ratory orders within the "sound discretion" of the agency. Since
the refusal to issue a ruling is subject to judicial review, it must
be founded upon sound reasons to give support to the agency's
position.
There is no need to consider the merits and demerits of the
standard declaratory judgment procedure as used in the courts
since that procedure is now almost universally accepted with evi-
dent success. As the functions of the declaratory judgment and
declaratory ruling are markedly similar, it follows that any of the
arguments against declaratory judgments would carry but relative
weight when used against declaratory rulings.
Since "the perils of unanticipated sanctions and liabilities" are
as great in the administrative field as they are in the judicial arena,
requirements favoring certitude and definitiveness should be en-
couraged in that sphere as well as in the other. The declaratory
ruling, in aiding the termination of a controversy or the removal
of uncertainty, provides valuable guidance to the public- as-
sistance which may be absent when the procedure has not been
given statutory sanction.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Although both the Ohio Act34 and the Federal Act 30 contain
sections relating to the admissibility of evidence before adminis-
trative tribunals, neither attempts to formulate standards for such
admissibility. The section of the Federal Act restricts the use of
evidence, however, by requiring that "no sanction shall be imposed
or rule or order be issued except ... as supported by and in ac-
cordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."
Section 9 (1) of the Model Act36 differs from the Ohio and Federal
Acts in two aspects. Firstly, it requires that the court rules of
privilege be applicable to administrative agencies. And secondly,
the section attempts to provide a standard by which agencies may
test the admissibility of other proffered evidence. While the section
may be criticized for not providing more specific standards, it af-
fords "nonetheless a formula, in contrast with the federal act's
carte blanche." 37
The evidence provisions of the other state administrative pro-
cedure acts vary considerably. While California and Wisconsin
subscribe to the Model Act's requirement as to privilege, 38 no state
has adopted the admissibility standard of the Act. North Dakota39
3 4 0mo GEN. CODE § 154-70(5) reads as follows: "The agency shall pass
upon the admissibility of evidence, but a party may at the time make objec-
tion to the rulings of the agency thereon, and if the agency refuses to admit
evidence, the party offering the same shall make a proffer thereof, and such
proffer shall be made a part of the record of such hearing."
3 5 Section 7(c) of the Federal Act is as follows: "Except as statutes other-
wise provide, the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof.
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall
as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order
be issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such portions
thereof as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in accordance
with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Every party shall have
the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to
submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determ-
ining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses any
agency may, where the interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby,
adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written
form."
36 Section 9 (1) is as follows: "Agencies may admit and give probative ef-
fect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by rea-
sonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. They shall give effect to
the rules of privilege recognized by law. They may exclude incompetent,
irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence."
37Abel, ibid, page 239.
38 CAL. GovER~mENT CODE § 11513 (c) (Supp. 1945); Wis. STAT. §227.10 (1947).
3 9 N. D. REv. CODE § 28-3206 (1943).
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attempts to standardize its agency rules of evidence by providing
that the agencies shall use the same rules as do the state district
courts except when such rules must be waived by the agency to
ascertain the substantive rights of all the parties. And when such
rules are waived, only evidence of probative value shall be ac-
cepted. The acts of four states40 provide that their agencies shall
not be bound by the usual common law or technical rules of evi-
dence. Of these, California prescribes that any evidence may be
used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining any direct
evidence but shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding un-
less it would be admissible over objection in the trial of a civil ac-
tion.41
Some statutes in Ohio attempt to deal with administrative rules
of evidence on an individual agency basis. Several provide that the
agency shall apply the same rules as does a court in the trial of a
civil action.4 2 Other statutes provide that the appropriate agencies
shall not be bound by common law, statutory, technical or formal
rules.48 In marked contrast to the Model Act's provision as to
privilege, Section 1465-27 of the Ohio General Code provides that
in any proceeding based upon or growing out of a violation of any
law which is administered by the tax commission, a party may not
refuse to testify or produce evidence on the ground of self-incrimi-
nation. However, to protect him, the section further provides that
he cannot be prosecuted for any transaction concerning which he
testified, except for perjury in his testimony. Our survey of state
agencies and further research revealed that some agencies have
regulations dealing with the admission of evidence in their ad-
judicatory hearings. 44 The survey also indicated that many agencies
40 CAL. GovmxwENT CODE § 11513 (c) (Supp. 1945); Ind. Acts 1927, c. 365,
§ 8; PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 71, § 1710.32 (Supp. 1946); Wis. STAT. § 227-10 (1947).
41 CAL. GovEimm CODE § 11513 (c) (Supp. 1945).
42 OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 1465-90 (rehearings before the Industrial Conmis-
sion), 1326 (State Dental Board), 552 (Public Utilities Commission - "Except
as otherwise provided.."), 2967-4 (hearings before Probate Judge to establish
local park districts).
43 Omo GEN. CODE §§ 1465-91 (Industrial Commission), 1359-21 (Di-
vision and subdivisions of Aid to Aged), 1359-41 (Department of Public Wel-
fare and Counties - in relation to charities).
44 Illustrative of such regulations are Rule XIII § 6 of the Civil Service
Commission, Regulation A-9 of the Division of Securities, and Regulation 7,§ 6 of the Board of Liquor Control which provide that the reception of evidence
at such hearings shall be governed in general by the rules applied by the
courts in the trials of civil actions. Regulation 8 of the Division of Social
Administration takes the opposite approach, providing that technical rules
shall not apply, but reasonable efforts should be made to obtain the most
credible evidence. The regulation further provides that opinion evidence of
a subjective nature or of an expert or technical nature may be introduced
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have unofficial admissibility standards. 45 Most of the agencies ex-
pressing an opinion on the problem believed their present system
to be satisfactory.4
While there has been agitation for applying all evidentiary
court rules to administrative agencies, such views are less vocal to-
day. Yet there is continuing expression which favors restricting
agency discretion in evidentiary matters. It is thought that at least
a few of the established rules of evidence, whose value is un-
questioned, would have equal merit when applied to the admin-
istrative process. The Model Act provision relating to the rules of
privilege is an outgrowth of such thought. The reasons why the
drafters of the Model Act did not incorporate other positive rules
of evidence must be left for conjecture. It would seem safe to as-
sume, however, that all the other rules were evaluated and found
to be wanting, or that the evaluation process was omitted for one
reason or another. It is our belief that the Model Act could well
have included other rules in addition to the rule of privilege. This
latter rule was no doubt incorporated into the section since its
workability went unchallenged and there appeared to be no reason
why, assuming its social desirability, it should not be equally satis-
factory in administrative tribunals. But these arguments might
also favor the application of other rules to administrative bodies.
Many studies have been made which evaluate specific evidentiary
rules in the light of their applicability to the administrative pro-
cess,47 yet no persuasive argument has been found which supports
only if the hearing officer has established the competency of the witness.
Regulation 30823 of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation and Rule
I, 905.2 of the Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation are even more
liberal in granting discretion to the hearing officer.
4 5 Such standards vary widely from agency to agency. For example, the
Motor Vehicle Dealers' and Salesmans' Licensing Board and the Board of Tax
Appeals attempt to apply the usual judical rules while the Division of Insur-
ance and the Tax Commissioner apply a more liberal standard. Of interest
is the fact that some agencies appear to apply standards quite different from
the official statutory or regulatory controls. For example, the Division of
Aid to the Aged, by reason of Omio Gra. CoDS § 1359-21, is not bound by the
usual technical rules, yet the returned questionnaire from this agency re-
vealed that they do apply the judical rules of evidence. On the other hand,
the Division of Securities indicated that they permit "broad latitude -not
common law rules of evidence" in spite of a regulation on the subject provid-
ing that the judical rules should apply as far as applicable. The situations
would seem to call for amendments to the regulations.
40 Of the agencies replying to the question, five expressed satisfaction
with their present system and three favored the section.
47For such studies see: Stephen, The Extent to Which Fact-Finding
Boards Should Be Bound by Rules of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 630 (1938), 18
Oar. L. Rlv. 229 (1939); Collins, Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should
Be Bound by Rules of Evidence, 12 CoNN. B.J. 278 (1938); Kach, Evidence Be-
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the thought that the rule of privilege is more applicable to admin-
istrative law than are other rules, such as the rule against un-
sworn testimony. While a plea for the reconsideration of the rules
of evidence for application to the administrative process could be
effectively made, it is doubtful whether many of the rules would
be found suitable for such purposes. At any rate, the study would
point up the rules which have the characteristics essential for adop-
tion into the administrative process.
Notwithstanding the application of additional evidentiary rules
to the administrative field, a device would be necessary to resolve
any remaining problems. It is granted that any attempt to apply
all of the rules of evidence to the administrative field would be
harmful, since they were evolved out of a lay jury system and
their application to the administrative program would be unten-
able.
Section 9 (1) of the Model Act includes the provision which
gives effect to the rule of privilege and a broad general formula
for the admission of evidence having probative value. Its broad
terminology is so inclusive as to be generally ineffective in carry-
ing forth the restrictive intentions of its authors. Futhermore,
it is unlikely that the admission of irrelevant evidence or that
having no probative value could constitute reversible error under
the Modelr Act when the decision is founded upon sufficient pro-
bative evidence. Thus the Model Act seems impotent either as
a mandatory or voluntary measure.
It appears that the drafters of the Federal Act were aware of
these problems since the section was founded on the assumption
that the exclusionary rules of evidence are not suitable for a
general act. While the language of the two Acts is similar in
the restrictive use of secondary evidence, the Model Act, by its
terms, is less flexible in permitting the introduction of non-
probative evidence. The Federal Act allows for the inclusion of
secondary evidence which might be the center of controversy
under the Model Act, but requires that the administrative de-
termination be based upon probative evidence.
It has been the practice in Ohio to adopt special statutes or
regulations on evidence which are directed toward only one agen-
cy. While this method lacks uniformity, it has the advantage of
patterning the rules to the specific requirements of an agency.
Its weakness is the absence of comprehensive coverage of the
state bodies by such statutes or regulations.
Our thought is that a modification of the Ohio system to
fore Fact-Finding Boards, 45 Com. L.J. 473 (1940); Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364
(1942).
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include the general provision of the Federal Act and appropriate
statutes affecting specific agencies might be favored here over
the Model Act. There are, no doubt, certain agencies which
because of the nature of their programs, should be required to
use a few or, perhaps, many of the judicial rules of evidence.
Under such circumstances the rules deemed appropriate to indi-
vidual agencies could be made mandatory by specific legislation.
But for the agencies whose programs do not lend themselves to
specific control, no requirements would be made as to admissi-
bility. Then, with only a provision like that of the Federal Act
applicable, determinations would be restricted to probative evi-
dence.
USE OF FACTS NOT OF RECORD
Sections 9(2) and 9(4) of the Model Act'$ and Section 7(d)
of the Federal Act 49 provide that agency determination should
be founded only upon evidence of record or evidence officially
noticed. Both acts require that any party whose position would
be placed in jeopardy by the taldng of such notice be given the
opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. While the provisions
requiring all evidence to be of record use different terminology,
their effect is substantially the same. The Federal Act, however,
adds a clause which permits the securing of a copy of the record
by the interested party upon payment of its cost.
The provisions relating to official notice are dissimilar to a
greater degree. The Federal Act does not specifically authorize
agencies to take official notice nor does it define the limitations
4 8 Section 9(2) of the Model Act reads as follows: "All evidence, includ-
ing records and documents in the possession of the agency of which it de-
sires to avail itself, shall be offered and made a part of the record in the case,
and no other factual information or evidence shall be considered in the de-
termination of the case. Documentary evidence may be received in the form
of copies or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference." Section 9(4) of the
Act reads, "Agencies may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and in
addition may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within their
specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or during hear-
ing, or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material so
noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so no-
ticed. Agencies may utilize their experience, technical competence, and special-
ized knowledge in the evaluation of the evidence presented to them."
49 Section 7(d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act is as fol-
lows: "The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and
requests filed in the proceeding, shall constitute the exclusive record for de-
cision in accordance with section 8 and, upon payment of lawfully prescribed
costs, shall be made available to the parties. Where an agency decision rests
on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record,
any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the
contrary."
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of such procedure. Instead, it merely provides for the conse-
quences of such action. Section 9(4) of the Model Act, on the
other hand, grants authority to agencies to take notice of "judi-
cially cognizable facts and in addition . . . of general, technical,
or scientific facts within their specialized knowledge." This sec-
tion contains an additional provision which preserves the right
of the agencies to utilize their knowledge and experience in the
evaluation of the evidence without, at the same time, granting
rebuttal rights to the interested parties.
The theory of requiring the agencies by statute to restrict
their determinations to the record has been followed in North
Dakota.50 The resulting provision is substantially the same as
are those of the Federal and Model Acts; however, it adds the
clause, "except as otherwise provided," which must under the
other acts be read into the sections to reconcile their provisions.
Four states' administrative procedure acts permit the taking
of official notice. California 5l and Wisconsin 52 have sections es-
sentially the same as Section 9(4) of the Model Act. Missouri,5 3
while defining official notice in substantially the same manner,
distinguishes the taking of judicially cognizable facts and ex-
empts the taking of these facts from the requirement that the
opportunity for rebuttal must be provided the interested party.
North Dakota"4 also makes this distinction, but defines official
notice differently. It permits the agency to "avail itself of com-
petent and relevant information or evidence in its possession or
furnished by members of its staff, or secured from any person
in the course of an independent investigation conducted by such
agency." This is a broad extension of the principle, yet usual
protection is provided interested parties by granting them re-
buttal rights.
Ohio has no such provisions either in its Administrative Pro-
cedure Act or elsewhere. Only one agency, the Division of Social
Administration, was found to have a regulation restricting the
making of decisions to evidence introduced at hearings.55 Our
survey of state agencies and further investigation did not dis-
close any agency regulation relating to official notice. However,
the study revealed that the vast majority of the more important
50 N. D. REv. CODE, § 28-3206 (1943).
5 1 CAL. GovEmmiENT CODE, §11515 (Supp. 1945).
52WIS. STAT., § 227.10 (1947).
53 Mo. REV. STAT. Am., § 1140.107 (Supp. 1948).
5 N. D. REv. CODE, § 28-3207 (1943).
55 Regulation 8 of the Ohio Division of Social Administration.
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state bodies take judicial or official notice of certain facts.56 And
there was no unanimity of opinion expressed by the agencies as
to the desirability of the Model Act section.T
It is conceded that the application of a requirement that all
evidence be of record, without an exception for official notice,
would seriously hamper administrative adjudication. Such adju-
dication would, in fact, be more restricted than is that of the
courts in which judicial notice is taken. It is our belief, how-
ever, that the resultant effect of the legislation is beneficial.
Firstly, judicial review of an administrative determination is hin-
dered by the absence of a record containing all the facts upon
which the decision was based. Secondly, the legislation provides
interested parties the bases for complete evidentiary information
which may be essential in the preparation of their cases. Third-
ly, the legislation provides for a more suitable use of the facts
by all parties, avoiding problems of misconception or misappli-
cation of facts, innocent or otherwise.
Various arguments are lodged against this legislation. Once
again, the matter of increased work load of agencies is stressed.
It is argued that the program lengthens precedure unduly by
requiring the formal introduction and inclusion of less signifi-
cant evidence or by requiring agencies to inform the disputants
of each officially noticed fact and by providing the opportunity
for the introduction of rebuttal evidence. The belief is that
agency officials often possess information, the accuracy of which
is unquestioned, but are unable to provide the source of such
knowledge for introduction into evidence without undue burden.
This formalization requires the supporting of such knowledge by
source material which may be buried in inaccessible records or
files. The information may also have been gleaned by experience
from indeterminable reference data. If, on the other hand, the
solution is found in the taking of official notice, then the hear-
ings must be lengthened to permit rebuttal evidence. The con-
tention is that this section would thereby deter agencies from
using their accumulated knowledge and experience in the fur-
therance of their administrative responsibilities.
The section is also criticized as being unenforceable since it
could never be shown that an agency restricted its findings to
evidence of record. The problem is also raised that administra-
5 Of the thirteen agencies investigated, eleven take notice of judicially
cognizable facts with five of these also taking notice of scientific or technical
facts. Only two agencies indicated that they restrict their determinations ex-
clusively to the evidence presented.
57 Of the nine agencies replying to the question, two expressly objected
to the section and five indicated no objection.
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tive bodies find it very difficult to indicate which facts are to
be officially noticed prior to making determinations since before
that time the gaps in the evidence are indeterminable. In fact,
both the Model and Federal Acts, in this regard, are also sub-
ject to the criticism that from a literal reading, both require
the rebuttal rights to be granted even for judicially cognizable
facts.5 s
Some arguments against the legislation are indisputable and
they and other disadvantages must be weighed against the bene-
fits gained. Admittedly, the work and time involved under this
procedure would be increased. However, such increase would
not be great, since most of the added evidence would be used
through the notice provision rather than by formal introduction.
As for providing source information, the agency would not gen-
erally be required to search out illusive data, except where they
are in dispute or are not of general information. Frequently,
the hearing officer, because of his detailed knowledge and experi-
ence, would recall and notice certain information; such action
would not require an agency to furnish its sources. While we
recognize the problem created by increased work load, that of
itself, in our opinion, is insufficient to overcome the arguments
favoring the program.
A clause in Section 9(4) of the Model Act reads, "Agencies
may utilize their experience, technical competence, and special-
ized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to them."
This is an attempt partially to allay the fear that agencies may
be hampered in their use of accumulated knowledge and experi-
ence. While the use of that knowledge in the evaluation process
differs only in degree from the use of such as a substitute for
evidence,59 the distinction is recognizable. It would seem, more-
over, that should the agency desire to use its specialized knowl-
edge as a substitute for evidence, this would be acceptable, under
either Act, so long as the interested parties are so apprised. The
point is well taken that agencies often are unable to indicate
prior to making their decisions the facts which must be noticed;
however, that is not always true, for the fact-patterns are fre-
quently discernible for such purposes during the earlier stages
of the proceedings. When this information can be determined
during the hearing, such knowledge should be disclosed prompt-
ly to give the interested parties an opportunity to answer the
contentions. On the other hand, when the agency cannot make
5 8 See Nathanson, ibd, page 273, who also holds that this is unsound since
facts judicially noticed are generally considered to be beyond the scope of
reasonable dispute.
59See Benjamin, ibid, page 210.
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such determinations, notice can be deferred until the close of the
proceedings when the issues are sufficiently crystallized. Then
an opportunity can be given for the re-opening of the proceed-
ings to rebut the issues raised by the taking of the notice.
Granted, the sections do contain unenforceable features, for
so long as there is substantial evidence in the record and the
agency purports to rely solely on it, an agency finding could not
be reversed on the ground that extraneous information rather
than the evidence of record was the basis of the determination.
However, since the legislation would tend to discourage such
agency action, its benefits would be salutary. Furthermore, the
provisions regarding the rebuttal rights would be enforceable
when official notice is taken and the rights of agencies as to
the use of notice, both "judicial" and "official," would be express-
ly integrated and codified into legislation.
While it might appear incongruous to require agencies to per-
mit rebuttal rights when judicially cognizable facts are noticed,
such procedure has merit. If the facts noticed are seemingly be-
yond reasonable dispute, no rebuttal would be forthcoming to
lengthen the proceedings. If, on the other hand, the agency's
determination is in error as to the interpretation or scope of the
doctrine, and goes beyond the recognized grounds for its find-
ings, the interested party's rights would be protected.
A favorable conclusion can be reached, in view of these argu-
ments, for the inclusion of provisions similar to Sections 9(2)
and 9(4) of the Model Act into the Ohio Administrative Proce-
dure Act. They provide a uniform basis for the integration of
information or evidence without adversely affecting the opera-
tions of the agencies. They preclude agency officials from reach-
ing their judgments on facts extraneous to the record. Yet agen-
cies are not prevented from utilizing "their experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge" in the evaluation of the
evidence. While proficiency and expertness are essential for the
effective execution of the administrative process, the public should
have the privilege to refute data used by agency personnel or
to explain or supplement such facts.
DECISIONs 3N WRITING
Section 11 of the Model Act6 0 and Section 8 (b) of the Fed-
60 Section 31 of the Model Act is as follows: "Every decision and order
adverse to a party to the proceeding, rendered by an agency in a contested
case, shall be in writing or stated in the record and shall be accompanied by
findings of fact ancd conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of
a concise statement of the conclusions upon each contested issue of fact. Par-
ties to the proceeding shall be notified of the decision and order in person or
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eral Act6' relate to decisions or orders of administrative tribu-
nals. The two sections contain significant differences in phrase-
ology and effect. Both sections require that decisions be accom-
panied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. While the
Model Act provides that these shall be in "writing and stated in
the record" and the Federal Act states that they shall "become
a part of the record," this distinction, if any, is lacking in im-
portance. A significant difference arises, however, since the Model
Act contains no clause comparable to that of the Federal Act
which requires the inclusion of the reasons or bases for the
findings and conclusions with the decision. The sections also
differ in that the Model'Act requires findings "upon each con-
tested issue of fact," whereas the Federal Act requires such for
"material issues of fact." Furthermore, the Federal Act requires
findings and conclusions, together with reasons therefor, upon
matters of discretion. The Model Act also provides for notifica-
tion of the interested parties and for delivery of the decision,
findings, and conclusions to such parties upon request. While
the Federal Act does not contain a similar provision in Section
8(b), it requires in Section 3(b) that each agency publish or
make available to public inspection final opinions or orders in
the adjudication of cases.
Most of the states with administrative procedure acts have
similar sections.62 Only one of these, Pennsylvania, specifically
requires that the reasons for findings be given. An unusual
feature, found in the North Dakota section, is a thirty-day time
limit in which the decision must be rendered.
While there is no comparable section in its administrative
procedure act, Ohio does have many specific statutes which apply
this principle individually to agencies. 63 In view of the exten-
by mail. A copy of the decision and order and accompanying findings and
conclusions shall be delivered or mailed upon request to each party or to his
attorney of record."
1The pertinent provision of Section 8(b) of the Federal Act reads, "All
decisions (including initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall be-
come a part of the record and include a statement of (1) findings and con-
clusions, as well as the reasons or bases therefor, upon all the material issues
of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and (2) the appropriate
rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof."
62 CAL. GovEnMaNT CODE, § 11518 (Supp. 1945); Mo. REV. STAT. Arm.,
§ 1140.109 (Supp. 1948); N. C. GEN. STAT., § 150-1 (1943); N. D. REv. CoDE,§ 28-3213 (1943); PA. STAT. AN., Tit. 71, § 1710.34 (Supp. 1946); VA. CODE Ar.,
§ 580(7) (Supp. 1948).
6 3 Onro GEN. CODE, §§ 459 (Commission to consider claim that individual's
property was destroyed by public works); 499-16 (Public Utilities Commis-
sion- hearing to ascertain value); 614-46a (Public Utilities Commission-all
contested cases); 669-11 (Superintendent of Insurance -licensing of non-
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siveness of such legislation in Ohio, few agencies attempt to regu-
late themselves on the subject.64 It should be noted that our
survey revealed that few state agencies favor the adoption of
Section 11 of the Model Act in Ohio. 65 As this section is an
entirely restrictive measure, this sentiment is not at all surpris-
ing.
Many arguments have been advanced which support this leg-
islation. Initially, it is strongly urged that the formulation of
findings of fact or the writing of opinions aid in insuring con-
sidered action by the agencies. 6 Such precedure would help the
conscientious officials in differentiating between good reasoning
and bias or superficial thinking. It would aid in effectuating a
discipline "wholly absent where there is freedom to announce a
naked conclusion." It would also expose agency rationale to pub-
lic, professional, and academic scrutiny. However embarrassing
or troublesome this might be to agencies, its effect on the fair-
ness of the administrative adjudicatory process would be sig-
nificant. In addition, it would have a placating effect upon
disgruntled parties. Furthermore, written opinions would be of
immeasurable assistance to affected parties in considering the
advisability of appeal.
The use of opinions or findings of fact by agencies has also
been favored since they serve as a basis for informed judicial
review and as a guide in planning future conduct by all affect-
ed parties. Additional benefits are derived from the procedure
when decisions of an agency are rendered by numerous subordi-
nate officials. These officials, by being better informed of policy
through the opinions, can coordinate their work with resultant
profit hospital associations); 669-32 (Superintendent of Insurance - non-prof-
it medical care associations); 687-2 (Superintendent of Insurance-taking
possession of building and loan businesses -required only when association
makes application and court orders Superintendent to so act); 1064 (State
Board of Arbitration and Conciliation -labor dispute investigations); 1334-14
(State Board of Examiners of Architects -license revocations); 1464-1 (7)(Board of Tax Appeals- when there is finding on no tax liability or over
taxation); 1464-3 (2) (Tax Commissioner); 1465-47a (Industrial Commission
- referees - when there are no transcripts of testimony and evidence); 1465-
90 (Industrial Commission).
64 Our survey of state agencies and an independent search disclosed that
only two agencies have such regulations. See Rule 421 of the Ohio Bureau
of Unemployment Compensation and Regulation 8 of the Ohio Division of
Social Administration.
65 Of the agencies expressing an opinion on the subject, one favored the
section, one had no objection, three felt it to be unnecessary, and four opposed
it. It should be mentioned that two of those believing such a section unneces-
sary already are covered by specific statutes.
66 Benjamin, ibid, page 253; Final Report, ibid, page 29.
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uniformity and consistency. Another special situation to which
written opinions fit themselves particularly well is that in which
one agency or branch of an agency reviews the decisions of an-
other. Opinion writing in this instance not only reflects the ad-
vantages given herein, but also better informs and instructs the
lower echelon agency as to policy.
Imposing as the above arguments might seem, the principle
of requiring agencies to write opinions or formulate findings has
not met with universal support. The critics of this proposal, as
do those of most of the sections considered in this discussion,
cite the increase of the work load which the requirement entails.
While some agencies are capable of taking on this task, it is
believed that most are unable to meet the additional demands.
Factors affecting this problem include the requirement for ex-
peditious decisions, volume of business, size and character of the
staff, and budgetary limitations.
The section has also been pointedly criticized as being un-
necessary legislation. While the Model Act section does not re-
quire findings when the decisions are unfavorable to the agency
and favorable to the outside interest, they are required for all
decisions "adverse to a party . . . in a contested case." The
Federal Act is even more stringent in that it provides that "all"
decisions shall include findings, conclusions, and reasons there-
for. While either section may be capable of being waived, the
absence of discretion in the agency as to whether opinions or
findings should be prepared raises forceful objections. Thus it
might be charged that the proposal involves a borrowing of a
court procedure and its application in an even stricter sense to
agencies. While some courts are required by state constitution
or statute to prepare opinions, this requirement generally is lim-
ited to appellate rather than trial courts. Furthermore, as to some
states these requirements are not all-inclusive, since they are
limited by general or specific standards. It should also be noted
that the majority of the states have no constitutional or statutory
provisions as to the writing of judicial opinions. 7 The Ohio Con-
stitution, however, ordains that "the decisions in all cases in the
supreme court shall be reported, together with the reasons there-
for, and laws may be passed providing for the reporting of cases
in the courts of appeals."68 There is no constitutional or statu-
tory provision requiring opinions to be written by the appellate
or nisi prius courts of Ohio.6 9 Notwithstanding the requirement
67 Courts -Interpretation of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Re-
quiring Written Opinions, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 485 (1939).
68 OHIO CONST. Art. IV, § 6; see also OHio Gms. COD, §§ 1483 and 1484.
69 See Feeman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 85, 89, 1 N. E. 2d 620 (1936).
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of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of Ohio, with justifica-
tion, issues numerous memorandum decisions without supporting
reasons. Were it to do otherwise, it would needlessly increase
the bulk of opinions without furthering the clarification of legal
principles. 70 The Ohio Supreme Court has also ruled that the
syllabus, and not the opinion, is the law of the case,71 thus appre-
ciably reducing the importance of judicial reasoning in opinions.
This is consistent with the views of some that the courts are
more adept at decision-making than at reason-giving. 72 In view
of these considerations, is it unreasonable to inquire why admin-
istrative bodies, which generally function on a plane comparable
to trial courts, should be subjected to restrictions equal to those
of the highest court in a state?
Another criticism relates to the extent or inclusiveness of
findings or opinions of administrative agencies. The Model Act
requires findings "upon each contested issue of fact" while the
Federal Act assumes a more liberal view by requiring opinions
only upon the material issues. Very few of the requirements
placed upon the courts are so severe. Assuming, for the moment,
that all cases contain some element worthy of discussion, it does
not follow that each essential or material issue warrants inclu-
sion. To a great extent much of the reasoning and decision-
making would be repetitive or require the expenditure of agency
efforts to "delineate the obvious." The resultant effect would be
the issuance of many opinions containing matters which are so
evident or repetitive as to be valueless. They would merely add
to the continuing volume of dubious legal writings which appear,
requiring integration, assimilation and analysis.
The critics of the sections also question the validity of the
argument that opinions and findings are essential to sapient judi-
cial review. Appellate courts have long been able to review the
actions of lower courts by the simple device of presuming that
all the necessary findings of fact were arrived at by the trial
judge or the jury. In this regard, it is believed that even should
the agency be required to write opinions or formulate findings,
these would be framed in such a manner as to pass the test of
judicial review. Finally, the critics of the section object to the
formalization of administrative adjudication that might result from
the procedure. They ish to preserve the informal character of
the agencies' proceedings and decry the addition of anything hay-
70 For a criticism of the principle in regard to the courts, see Radin, The
Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 4S6 (1930).71 For a consideration of this subject, see PoLLACk, Omo CoURT RuLEs
AimOTATED, 8 (1949).72 An example of such rumination is Powell, Some As-pects of Constitu-
tionalism and Federalism, 14 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1936).
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ing a litigious appearance.
We can find little support in answer to these criticisms of
the proposal. The proponents have de-emphasized the extent of
the increased work load which the procedure entails, arguing
that the findings or opinions need not be lengthy or elaborate.
It has also been suggested that in many situations forms could
be used to reduce the work involved. Some who favor the prin-
ciple insist on findings on each contested issue in each case, in
the belief that what is or is not significant is not readily dis-
cernible. The Model Act may be more attractive to some critics
than is the Federal Act since no reasons need be given with the
decisions, thus considerably reducing the work. In answer to the
critics' complaint against bulky volumes and materials, the pro-
ponents stress the progress that our legal system has made in its
preparation of indexes, digests and other reference tools. Yet,
how satisfactory have these instruments been in simplifying the
problems in other areas?
While we believe that the arguments favoring .the adoption of
this legislation carry much weight, the procedure presents prob-
lems involving practical difficulties. These complications do not
make for the ready adoption of the proposal on a uniform basis.
The preparation of opinions and findings of fact should, how-
ever be encouraged by specific legislation or voluntary action by
agencies as their individual programs permit. Ohio has over-
come this problem to a great extent by the enactment of specif-
ic legislation affecting individual agencies. Other agencies have
adopted portions of the program voluntarily and render opinions
or findings without statutory compulsion.
CONCLuSION
We are now experiencing a resurgence of interest in the ad-
ministrative organization of federal and state agencies, stemming
in part from the Hoover commission reports on the organization
of the executive branch of the federal government. Some states,
including Ohio, are following the federal report with plans for
the study of their state administrative organizations. While these
studies may be expected to make significant contributions to the
improvement of the administrative process, they are but segments
of entire programs which should be considered. Studies for the
standardization of procedures and the formulation and execution
of consistent policies and uniform criteria of state agencies, where
they are absent, are needed with equal urgency. While programs
which affect needed economies in the administration of govern-
ment, resulting in pecuniary savings, should be encouraged, the
important procedural and policy operations of state agencies, which
have a more direct bearing upon the conduct of agency affairs,
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should be appraised with equal vigor. True, economies wrought
by a more efficient administrative organization of agencies are
desirable. However, studies affecting improvements in the pro-
cedure and policy of state bodies are also important. And since
most state agencies are not equipped with budgets and person-
nel to undertake such programs, funds should be made available
and efforts should be exerted to provide balance to each state
program for the improvement of the administrative process.
